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China's entry into global markets has had an important e®ect on the rules of the world trading system.
After close to ¯fteen years of negotiations that began under the General Agreement on Tari®s and
Trade (GATT), China was ¯nally granted membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) in
2001. While China's accession to the organization was heralded as a signi¯cant achievement for trade
policy negotiators, its terms of accession introduced new allowances for existing members to deviate
from historic and core GATT/WTO principles. In particular, the commitment that members adhere
to the fundamental rules of reciprocity and most-favored nation (MFN) treatment, the second of which
is also referred to as nondiscriminatory treatment across trading partners, was substantially weakened
through the introduction of a newly available \China safeguard" import-restricting policy instrument.
A political justi¯cation for the new safeguard was that China's export capacity threatened to disrupt
established trade patterns. Furthermore, an unprecedented statutory trigger for use of the import
restriction is the phenomenon of \trade de°ection," i.e., where a di®erent country's imports from
China surge because of a ¯rst country imposing its own trade restriction that shut Chinese exports
out of its market.
This paper empirically investigates whether there is historical evidence that the imposition of
discriminatory import restrictions on Chinese trade de°ected Chinese exports to third markets during
its pre-accession period. Since the discriminatory China safeguard was not in use during this period,
we address the question by matching data on Chinese exports to 38 destination markets to a new
dataset of discriminatory antidumping measures imposed on China by two of its most important
trading partners. To the best of our knowledge, this is the ¯rst paper to investigate whether Chinese
exports have been de°ected to alternative markets when hit with discriminatory trade restrictions.
Prior research investigating related questions has found evidence of such trade de°ection; nevertheless,
the prior evidence has not investigated Chinese exports, as it has been limited to the examination of
exports from other countries and/or is focused on speci¯c industries.1
WTO members created a \Transitional Product-Speci¯c Safeguard Mechanism" that can be used
against imports from China until 2014 under Section 16 of China's terms of accession (WTO, 2001).
Many characteristics of the new China safeguard are at odds with core WTO principles and estab-
1In work motivated by the EU's 2002 global safeguard policy on steel which invoked a similar concern over trade
de°ection emanating from the U.S. steel safeguard (EU, 2002), Bown and Crowley (2007) ¯nd substantial evidence
that the imposition of administered import-restricting trade policies against Japanese exports led to export surges to
alternative markets. Durling and Prusa's (2006) investigation of global exports from the hot rolled steel market provides
some evidence for trade de°ection, as does Debaere's (forthcoming) investigation of the shrimp market in response to
the EU's discriminatory revocation of GSP status for Thai exporters.
1lished instruments of administered import protection traditionally available to its Members.2 First,
unlike any other import-restricting policy instrument legally available to the WTO membership, the
allowance of a China-speci¯c trade restriction on imports of fairly traded goods is otherwise incon-
sistent with MFN treatment.3 Second, the use of the new China safeguard also does not require the
policy-imposing country to immediately compensate China for withdrawing trade concessions. This,
in e®ect, weakens the commitment to the WTO's reciprocity principle as well.4
The most radical change introduced by the new China safeguard is the weakened evidentiary
criterion that WTO members must satisfy in order to legally impose a new barrier to Chinese trade.
Speci¯cally, section 16.8 of China's accession introduced the following,
\If a WTO Member considers that an action [i.e., a China safeguard imposed by another
Member]... causes or threatens to cause signi¯cant diversions of trade into its market [i.e.,
`trade de°ection'], it may request consultations with China and/or the WTO Member
concerned... If such consultations fail to lead to an agreement... the requesting WTO
Member shall be free, in respect of such product, to withdraw concessions accorded to or
otherwise limit imports from China..." (WTO, 2001, p. 10).
The implication of section 16.8 is that, if one WTO member imposes a China safeguard, a second
WTO member can automatically impose a China safeguard on the same product without having to
undertake its own injury investigation. Thus the second country can impose a China safeguard on the
same product without having to demonstrate actual evidence of a threat of de°ected imports from
China, evidence of an actual increase in imports from China, or even evidence of injury (or a threat of
2Some of the discriminatory elements of the China safeguard are reminiscent Japan's 1955 entry into the GATT.
In particular, a 1987 GATT working party pointed out that, despite the desire at the time for some existing members
to introduce a new Japan-speci¯c safeguard, \Japan became a contracting party in September 1955 without any new
general safeguard clause being added to the General Agreement. Some [13 out of 34] contracting parties invoked
Article XXXV [\Non-Application of the Agreement between Speci¯c Contracting Parties"] on Japan's accession. In a
number of cases, Japan negotiated bilateral trade agreements containing special safeguard clauses which were followed
by the countries concerned disinvoking Article XXXV." (GATT 1987, p. 2) For an additional discussion of the China
safeguard, see Messerlin (2004).
3There are three other primary areas under the WTO in which exceptions to MFN-treatment for import restrictions
are broadly permissible: 1) raising discriminatory trade barriers against unfairly traded goods under antidumping or
countervailing duty laws; 2) lowering trade barriers in a discriminatory manner under a reciprocal preferential trade
agreement; and 3) lowering trade barriers in a discriminatory manner to developing countries unilaterally, such as under
the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP).
4Bagwell and Staiger (1999) provide an economic interpretation of reciprocity under the GATT/WTO, noting that
it is primarily a rule for renegotiations that limits a WTO trading partner's permissible compensatory retaliation when
a ¯rst country seeks to raise its tari® above a previously agreed-upon level, as would be the case here.
2injury) to its own domestic industry. This is a substantial di®erence from all other WTO-authorized
import restrictions, which require some evidence and impose a nontrivial resource and political cost
on a country seeking to limit the market access previously granted to another WTO member.5 This
policy is based on the now codi¯ed provision that there exists a substantial threat that one country's
China safeguard will de°ect Chinese exports to a third market.
Thus far, the most public battles over use of the new China safeguard focused on the U.S. imposing
a new 35% tari® on imported Chinese tires in September 2009, and the U.S. and EU using its auspices
to negotiate Chinese voluntary export restraints on fairly traded imports of textile and clothing
products in 2005. Nevertheless, data collected from the WTO and reported in Bown (2010a) indicate
that at least ten di®erent WTO members initiated investigations under the new China-safeguard
policy between 2002 and 2009, with at least six of those countries imposing new trade barriers on
products as varied as °oat glass, polyvinyl chloride, and porcelain tiles (Turkey); tires (U.S.); soda ash
and aluminum (India); as well as textiles and clothing products (U.S., EU, Peru and Colombia).6 In
the midst of the global ¯nancial crisis in 2009, India alone initiated ¯ve di®erent investigations under
its China-safeguard policy. And an examination of countries with relatively transparent import policy
governance such as Canada (CITT, 2007) and the U.S. (ITC, 2007) indicates that WTO members
were quick to include the \trade de°ection" provision into their domestic implementing legislation
thus making it readily accessible for competing industries and policymakers seeking a new trigger to
limit Chinese exports.7
Is there historical evidence that discriminatory trade restrictions imposed on China have disrupted
5The standard safeguard investigation requires evidence of injury (or threat thereof) caused by increased imports.
Antidumping (countervailing duty) investigations also require evidence of less than fair value pricing (illegal export
subsidies) in addition to the evidence of injury caused by imports. For a discussion of the general role of safeguards in
the WTO, see Hoekman and Kostecki (2009).
6Bown (2010b) provides a more detailed discussion of China-speci¯c safeguard use between 2002 and 2006, includ-
ing the 2005 voluntary export restraints that the U.S. and EU negotiated over Chinese textile and apparel. The ten
economies that reported to the WTO that they initiated investigations between 2002 and 2009 are Canada; Colombia;
Ecuador; EU; India; Peru; Poland; Taiwan, China; Turkey; and the U.S. Note that the number of initiated investiga-
tions in the data is a lower bound due to lax WTO noti¯cation requirements - i.e., because Article 16 of China's WTO
Accession Protocol does not require members to notify the WTO of the initiation of investigations, some investigations
that did not result in new trade barriers (which must be noti¯ed to the WTO) may not have been reported. Further-
more, as stipulated under paragraph 241 of the Working Party Report on the Accession of China (WTO document
WT/MIN(01)/3), the separate China-speci¯c textile safeguard instrument available to WTO members until 2008 had
no noti¯cation obligation whatsoever. This explains why the U.S. and EU China-speci¯c textile safeguard cases in 2005
were not reported to the WTO and are not included in Bown (2010a).
7For the U.S., see `Section 422: China Trade Diversion Investigations' of the U.S. Trade Act of 1974, and for Canada,
see `Safeguard Inquiry: Trade Diversion Imports from China' of the Canadian International Trade Tribunal Act.
3trade °ows via trade de°ection? To investigate this question we examine the impact of discriminatory
trade policies on Chinese product-level exports over its pre-accession 1992-2001 period. We focus on
U.S. and EU imposition of product-speci¯c, discriminatory import restrictions.8 As table 1 indicates,
one motivation for focusing on the U.S. and EU is that they are two of China's four largest destination
markets for its exports. If China's exporters are able to de°ect trade, these are two of the markets
from which we expect trade de°ection to derive.9 Moreover, our focus on the e®ect of U.S. and
EU discriminatory trade policies is motivated by data requirements. Both the U.S. and EU utilize
discriminatory, antidumping import restrictions and publish very detailed, product-level information
on these policies. Using newly collected data on policy impositions at the product level (Bown, 2010a)
allows us to directly identify evidence of trade de°ection associated with such measures.10
Figure 1 provides a second motivation by illustrating the likely phenomenon of \trade destruction"
- i.e., the reduction of U.S. and EU imports and import growth in Chinese products that these
economies have targeted with new antidumping trade barriers. The ¯gures plot the average growth
for U.S. and EU imports from China for two di®erent categories of products over the 1990-2001
period: those targeted by antidumping and those products not targeted. The time path of imports of
products targeted with antidumping does provide anecdotal evidence of the necessary condition (trade
destruction in the U.S. and EU markets) that we expect to observe before anticipating that Chinese
exports may be de°ected to third markets; the latter of which is our primary empirical question of
interest.11
8In what follows below, for convenience we may refer to the EU as a \country" since it invokes a singular trade
policy stance toward Union non-members such as China.
9Furthermore, we believe there are good reasons to be less interested in focusing on two other primary export markets
for China - Hong Kong SAR, China and Japan - as the \triggers" for the trade de°ection. While Hong Kong SAR,
China was technically China's largest export market in 1997, much of China's exports sent there are never intended for
consumption, but instead for processing and re-export to other markets (Feenstra and Hanson, 2004). Furthermore,
while Japan is China's third largest export market and a potential additional country to investigate, Japan has rarely
used antidumping historically.
10Since China was not a WTO member during the sample period under investigation, even the mere attempt to
track other (non-U.S., non-EU) countries' imposition of new import restrictions against China at the product level is
extremely di±cult, given that such policies were neither restricted by the WTO nor were countries required to report
to the WTO the trade policies imposed against China.
11One issue that we address formally in the econometric approach described below, and which is motivated by a
comparison of ¯gures 1a and 1b, is that EU antidumping may have a di®erential impact on exports than US antidumping.
For example, EU import growth from China in products subject to antidumping on average fell less dramatically and
more slowly than US imports of products subject to US antidumping. And while it is not shown in the ¯gures (which
use indices to plot average import growth trajectories), on the other hand, the level of \de°ectable" (year t) product-
level EU imports from China that would be subject to antidumping ($23 million) was higher than US imports ($19
million) on average.
4Table 2 further documents that the U.S. and EU are useful countries on which to focus because
their antidumping authorities frequently targeted Chinese exports with new, discriminatory import
restrictions. Combined, China faced the most antidumping investigations and the most imposed mea-
sures over the 1992-2001 period, roughly twice as many as the next most-targeted exporter (Japan).
And as the middle columns indicate, under both the U.S. and EU antidumping regimes, China was
also a frequent single target of investigation, implying that it often faced the imposition of discrimina-
tory antidumping measures that will be most similar to the WTO's new China safeguard.12 Moreover,
even in investigations that target multiple foreign countries exporting the same product, an importer
can discriminate against China by imposing higher antidumping duties or more stringent price under-
taking requirements than those that are imposed on non-Chinese exporters of the same product. The
second-to-last column provides evidence that China faces higher-than-average antidumping measures
as well.
Nevertheless, despite China being a frequent target of both countries, table 3 indicates surprisingly
little overlap to the Chinese products that are targeted by both the U.S. and EU regimes. For
example, of the 123 unique 6-digit Harmonized System (HS) products exported from China that
faced antidumping measures in the U.S. and the EU during the 1990-2001 period, only fourteen of
those HS products were targeted by both countries over that twelve year period. As table 4 indicates,
most of these products are in the steel (metals) and chemicals industries, and it is even more rare
that the impositions occur in the same (or even adjacent) years.
With respect to our econometric investigation and results, perhaps surprisingly, we ¯nd no sys-
tematic evidence that U.S. or EU antidumping restrictions de°ected Chinese exports to third markets
over the 1992-2001 period. We examine the potential impact of contemporaneous as well as lagged
e®ects of such policies, and we employ two distinct econometric approaches. Not only is there no
evidence of trade de°ection to these markets, there is some weak evidence of a reduction in the relative
growth of Chinese exports of these targeted products to third markets. One interpretation is that this
evidence is consistent with a global \chilling e®ect" of U.S. and EU antidumping on Chinese exports
to alternative markets: i.e., Chinese exporters may be learning that certain products are in politically
sensitive sectors and choosing to slow down their export expansion in these products. The size of the
12An antidumping measure would be less discriminatory than a China safeguard if there were multiple exporters
targeted in a multi-country investigation of the same product. Hansen and Prusa (1996) argue that this is likely to
occur in the U.S. due to the incentive created by U.S. law for petitioning industries to seek to cumulate imports in
injury investigations. Furthermore, note that we do not examine the impact of countervailing duties because the U.S.
did not impose any countervailing measures against Chinese products over the 1992-2001 period (Bown, 2010a) due
to a 1984 Department of Commerce decision (upheld by the 1986 Georgetown Steel case) not to consider anti-subsidy
investigations of exports from non-market economies like China and the former Soviet Union.
5estimated e®ect is substantial as the conditional mean U.S. antidumping duty on China of 125% is
associated with a 20 percentage point reduction in the relative growth rate of China's exports.
Our empirical results indicate no historical evidence of import restrictions de°ecting Chinese trade
and disrupting established trading patterns. Ironically, it may not be China's export growth and abil-
ity to de°ect trade that poses a threat to the world trading system. Rather, a threat to the WTO
could be the China safeguard policy that has been designed in part to remedy (the historically non-
existent for China) trade de°ection, but which allows existing WTO members to easily deviate from
the WTO's core principles of reciprocity and MFN treatment. A substantial theoretical literature
examining the GATT/WTO, closely associated with the work of Bagwell and Staiger (2002),13 iden-
ti¯es reciprocity and MFN as some of the weakest rules necessary for countries to rely on to negotiate
an e±ciency-enhancing trade agreement initially and to sustain the agreement over time in the face of
political and economic shocks. From this perspective, our results raise the question of any political-
economic bene¯t to inclusion of the trade de°ection provision, when easy access to the new China
safeguard generated by this provision imposes costs via risks to the sustainability of the WTO.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 details our empirical approach and the related
literature. Section 3 describes the data used in the estimation, and section 4 presents our results and
basic robustness checks using a di®erence-in-di®erence estimation approach. In section 5 we provide
a last sensitivity analysis using an alternative, instrumental variables estimation approach. Section 6
concludes.
2 Empirical Model and Estimation
2.1 The empirical investigation
Our empirical analysis is motivated by a three country theoretical model in Bown and Crowley (2007)
which develops a number of predictions relating a change in one country's trade policy to changes
in trade °ows among other countries. The most novel predictions are termed \trade de°ection" and
\trade depression." When one country (A) imposes a country-speci¯c tari® on imports from another
country (B), the consequent rise in exports from the second country (B) to the third country (C) is
13While much of the initial work in this area is contained in Bagwell and Staiger (2002), other recent papers also
examine the roles of MFN and reciprocity as they relate to issues surrounding the accession of a substantial trading
partner. For example, the principles combine to form a ¯rst line of defense against `bilateral opportunism,' or the value
of a concession won by one country in an earlier negotiation being eroded due to the outcome of a subsequent set of
negotiations to which it is not party (Bagwell and Staiger, 2005). Furthermore, the principles can also be combined
to facilitate multilaterally e±cient outcomes, even when trade policy negotiations occur bilaterally and sequentially
(Bagwell and Staiger, 2004).
6termed trade de°ection. Trade depression refers to the reduction in the third country's (C's) exports
to the second country (B) when the ¯rst country (A) imposes a country-speci¯c tari® on imports
from country B. While it will not be the focus of empirical investigation here, the model also predicts
\trade destruction," i.e., that country A's import tari® against country B will result in a fall in A's
imports from country B. Lastly, the model predicts \trade creation through import source diversion"
or, more succinctly \trade diversion," i.e., that country A's imports from country C will rise (Viner,
1950).14
In this paper, we estimate an augmented gravity model of China's (country B's) product-level
exports to 38 trading partners (countries C) which has been adapted to estimate the e®ects of U.S.
and EU (countries A) imposition of product-level antidumping duties. For clarity of exposition,
ignoring China's other trading partners, what e®ects on trade °ows might we expect when the country
imposing the tari® is the U.S. and the foreign countries are Japan (country C) and China (country
B)? First, if the U.S. imposes a country-speci¯c tari® against China in the form of an antidumping
duty and imposes no tari® against Japan, we might expect de°ected trade, an increase in Chinese
exports to Japan. Second, if the U.S. imposes a country-speci¯c tari® against Japan in the form of
an antidumping duty, but not against China, we might expect that Chinese exports to Japan will
fall, i.e., depressed trade. In this case, Japanese exports that are diverted away from the U.S. market
by the tari® and sold domestically within Japan depress Japanese imports from China.
2.2 The empirical model
In light of the WTO rules on the China safeguard, our primary interest is identifying trade de°ection,
an increase in China's exports to some country i in response to a trade restriction imposed by another
country such as the U.S. or EU. We begin with a basic gravity speci¯cation for China's exports to
country i that incorporates trade policy changes introduced by the U.S. and EU on their own imports
from China. Ultimately we utilize two di®erent econometric approaches to estimating trade de°ection.
Each approach relies on a di®erent source of variation in the data to obtain identi¯cation and, thus,
speaks to the robustness of our results.
To begin, assume that China's exports to country i of a 6-digit HS product h in year t can be
written as a standard gravity model,
14Prusa (1997, 2001) and Konings, Vandenbussche and Springael (2001) provide earlier investigations for the trade
diversion impact of discriminatory antidumping use in the U.S. and EU markets, respectively.




























where xciht denotes exports from China to country i of 6-digit HS product h in year t, aih is country i's
time-invariant propensity to import good h (e.g., time-invariant trade barriers, transportation costs,
distance, culture, etc.), aht is a time-varying cost or productivity shock to good h, ait represents
country i's time-varying aggregate variables (e.g., GDP, the exchange rate, aggregate demand for
imports), and act represents China's time-varying aggregate variables (e.g., GDP, the exchange rate,
aggregate supply of exports). The ¿'s in equation (1) are the trade policy changes that might impact
China's exports to country i. Their ¯rst subscript indicates the country against which the restrictive
trade policy is imposed, the second subscript indicates the country imposing the trade restriction, the
third subscript denotes the product h, and the fourth subscript denotes the year j. Speci¯cally, we
include: the U.S. import tari® on good h exported from China (¿US
c;ushj), the EU import tari® on good
h exported from China (¿EU
c;euhj), the U.S. import tari® on good h exported from country i (¿US
i;ushj),
the EU import tari® on good h exported from country i (¿EU
i;euhj), and country i's import tari® on
good h exported from China (¿i
c;iht). Finally, it may be the case that the impact of a change in a
tari® on trade °ows to third markets occurs only after a time delay. Thus we allow for current trade
°ows to be a®ected by both the contemporaneous (j = t) imposition of a new trade restriction, as
well as trade policy changes of up to two lags (j = t ¡ 1;t ¡ 2).
In equation (1), the coe±cients ¯1j (¯2j) and ¯3j (¯4j) for j = t¡2;t¡1;t identify trade de°ection
and trade depression associated with U.S. (EU) antidumping duties, respectively. If the imposition
of a U.S. (EU) antidumping duty against China is associated with an increase in China's exports to a
third market, we expect that ¯1j (¯2j) will be greater than zero. Furthermore, estimates of ¯3j (¯4j)
that are less than zero indicate trade depression; i.e., the imposition of a U.S. (EU) antidumping duty
against country i is associated with a decrease in China's exports to that third market.
The greatest econometric concerns in estimating trade de°ection and trade depression in equa-
tion (1) are the potential endogeneity of the tari®s and the relationship between a change in a tari®
and any underlying cost or productivity shock a®ecting a particular 6-digit HS good. With regard to
the tari®s, it seems reasonable to assume that the U.S. and EU antidumping duties are set indepen-
dently vis-µ a-vis China's exports to some third country i. Moreover, the correlation between U.S. and
EU trade policy changes against China in our sample is a very low 0.0006 suggesting that the U.S.
and EU only rarely, if ever, respond to a common cost or technology shock in China. Despite this
8evidence against the concern that trade policy is responding to a common Chinese technology shock
at the 6-digit HS level, we still want to carefully control for product-level shocks so that our estimates
of the coe±cients ¯1j through ¯4j can be interpreted as treatment e®ects of the policy change.
2.3 Di®erence-in-di®erence model to estimate trade de°ection
Our ¯rst approach identi¯es trade de°ection by utilizing variation within a 6-digit HS product across
two exporting countries. First, rewrite an analog to equation (1) in which the exporter, China, is
replaced with a subscript d to denote a di®erent exporting country with exporting characteristics
(described below) similar to China. Then we take the time di®erence of (1) for China as well as
the time di®erence of the analog equation for exporter d, and we di®erence those two equations.
Under the assumption that importing country i's trade policy is constant over the time period under
consideration,15 we then have:













d;euhj) + (¢²ciht ¡ ¢²diht):
(2)
The variable ¢xciht (¢xdiht) denotes the growth of Chinese (country d) exports of h to country i
at time t where ¢xciht ´
xciht¡xciht¡1
(xciht+xciht¡1)=2 in our basic speci¯cations. This average measure of the
growth rate of exports, used by Davis and Haltiwanger (1992), allows us to include observations
of zero trade in our estimation sample. Speci¯cally, this measure caps the growth rate of trade
between t ¡ 1 and t at +200% when there is entry into a market and -200% when there is exit from
a market. Including observations of China's entry (and exit) into speci¯c markets allows to examine
the extensive margin of China's trade, an important and interesting question for our empirical work
which seeks to understand if China, as a developing country, is also able to de°ect its exports to
new markets when it faces trade restrictions that may be shutting it out of the U.S. or EU markets.
Nevertheless, so as to check the robustnsess of our results, we also include speci¯cations that use
conventional log growth rate measures ¢xciht ´ lnxciht ¡ lnxciht¡1, omitting all observations on
entry and exit by construction and thus focusing on the intensive margin of trade. Next, we use year
dummies to control for aggregate shocks in China and country d, (¢act and ¢adt). The variable
¢¿US
c;usht (¢¿EU
c;euht) designates the magnitude of the contemporaneous change in the U.S. (EU) tari®
15Alternatively, if we assume that country i trade policy varies over time, but is MFN, or nondiscriminatory, we
arrive at the same speci¯cation.
9rate against imports from China. Similarly, the variable ¢¿US
d;usht (¢¿EU
d;euht) designates the magnitude
of the contemporaneous change in the U.S. (EU) tari® rate against imports from country d.
When implementing the model on a sample of data, we choose India as `country d' for a number of
reasons. As we detail below, India has considerable similarities with China when it comes to export
structure (both by commodity and by destination market), export growth during this time period,
and it is also an important target of both U.S. and EU use of antidumping.16
The coe±cients ¯1j and ¯2j for j = t¡2;t¡1;t identify trade de°ection associated with U.S. and
EU antidumping duties. If the imposition of a U.S. antidumping duty against China is associated
with an increase in China's exports relative to India's (country d's) exports, we expect that ¯1j will
be greater than zero. Similarly, if an increase in the U.S. antidumping duty against India induces
Indian trade de°ection, we expect India's exports to market i to rise relative to China's exports to
i, yielding a positive coe±cient on ¯1j. The same reasoning implies that trade de°ection associated
with an EU antidumping measure will yield an estimate of ¯2j that is positive.
Note, however, that one implication of this particular di®erence-in-di®erence approach is that we
cannot identify ¯3j and ¯4j - i.e., trade depression - from equation (2). We therefore introduce a
framework for estimating trade depression separately in the next section.
Finally, while equation (2) forms our baseline speci¯cation, as a robustness check we also estimate
a variant of the model to examine the possibility of \aggregate de°ection" by China and India (country
d) to all markets other than the U.S. and EU. Speci¯cally, in this particular sensitivity analysis we
sum Chinese exports to China's top 41 trading partners (see again table 1) less the U.S., EU and
India (country d) for each product in year t (xrow
cht ). Similarly, in accordance with our di®erence-in-
di®erence strategy, we sum India's (country d's) exports to those same 38 trading partners (China's
top 41 less the U.S., EU, and India) for each product h in each year t (xrow
dht ). We then estimate an
aggregated analog to equation (2) given by
(¢xrow
cht ¡ ¢xrow

















16While India did undertake a substantial unilateral trade liberalization episode during the 1991-1997 period, we
do not include information on India's import tari® changes in the estimation. While changes to India's import tari®
structure could feed through into changes into its exports, making this link would require a highly disaggregated input-
output mapping that is beyond the scope of this paper. In unreported results we have introduced controls for India's
own use of antidumping against China and the estimates we report below are una®ected.
10We also expect that aggregate trade de°ection associated with U.S. and EU duties will be associated
with positive coe±cient estimates of ¯1j and ¯2j.
2.4 Di®erence-in-di®erence model of trade depression
We use a similar di®erence-in-di®erence approach to estimate trade depression. To ¯x ideas once
again, we are interested in the question of whether China's exports to a third country market fall if
that country's own exports of a 6-digit HS product are subject to a U.S. or EU antidumping trade
restriction. In order to obtain identi¯cation in this case, we utilize variation in China's exports to
two di®erent countries that faced U.S. and EU antidumping restrictions between 1992-2001.
Taking the time di®erence of (1) for two separate export markets, we write the di®erence between
China's export growth to countries i and k as:













k;euhj) + (¢²c;iht ¡ ¢²ckht);
(3)
where variables are de¯ned as in (2), and we use year dummies to control for aggregate variation in
countries i and k. The coe±cients ¯3j and ¯4j for j = t¡2;t¡1;t identify potential trade depression
associated with U.S. and EU trade policies. Trade depression, a decline in China's exports to countries
i or k in the face of an antidumping measure, would imply estimates of ¯3j and ¯4j that are less than
zero.
Note, ¯nally, that there are two subtle di®erences between equations (3) and (2). First, with
respect to Chinese exports to two di®erent countries, even a China-speci¯c 6-digit HS productivity
shock falls out of the expression, so the restrictiveness of the assumption about time-varying produc-
tivity is less stringent in equation (2). Second, equation (3) implicitly assumes that tari® policies
by countries i and k are constant over the time period under consideration. In order to estimate
equation (3), we choose countries that infrequently changed their own tari®s over the sample period.
For reasons we detail below, we estimate equation (3) on relative Chinese export growth to Japan (i)
and Korea (k).
3 Variable Construction and Data
In this section we discuss the construction of variables used in the estimation. Tables 5 and 6 present
summary statistics for the primary data used in the estimation.
113.1 Trade variables
The dependent variables in the estimation of equations (2), (20), and (3) are constructed from the
annual volume of China's exports to 38 of its top markets for roughly 4700 6-digit Harmonized System
(HS) products for the years 1992 to 2001 (table 1). The data derives from the World Integrated Trade
System (WITS) COMTRADE data base. The dependent variable of equation (2) also requires data
on Indian (country d) exports of the same 4700 products to 38 of China's top markets. In our
robustness checks, we also use data on the value of Chinese and Indian exports to these markets. Our
¯nal estimation sample includes observations on the dependent variable from 1993 to 2001.
First consider the dependent variable in the estimation of equation (2), the di®erence between
the annual growth of China's exports to 38 di®erent countries i of commodity h and India's exports
of the same commodities to the same countries. In choosing India as `country d' in equation (2) we
were guided by a desire to match as closely as possible China's mix of export markets, its mix of
exported goods, its relatively high aggregate growth rate of exports, and the relatively high number of
antidumping measures imposed by the U.S. and EU between 1992-2001. Table 1 presents the shares
of exports by economy for China and India in 1997, the midpoint of our sample. First, the U.S. and
EU are important destination markets for both countries and represent a combined 31.0% (46.1%) of
China's (India's) total exports. They share a number of other important export markets including
Japan; South Korea; Singapore; Taiwan, China; Russia; Australia; Canada; and Malaysia. The
biggest di®erence is that China's top export market is Hong Kong SAR, China, with a 24.0% export
share; while it receives only 5.6% of India's exports. One likely explanation for this disparity was the
role of entrep^ ot trade Hong Kong SAR, China played for exports originating in China (Feenstra and
Hanson, 2004).17 Finally, export shares are similar in other years, but they do re°ect some changes
in the structure of trade over time.
Table 7 presents two pieces of data: the shares of China's and India's exports by broadly-de¯ned
goods categories for 1997, and the shares of total U.S. and EU antidumping against China and India
for each of the goods categories. First, much like the pattern of overall use of the policy found
in other research, metals is the primary industrial target for antidumping use against Indian and
Chinese exports. Overall, each of the 15 di®erent goods categories for Chinese exporters is a®ected
by some U.S. or EU antidumping, whereas antidumping against Indian exporters is more heavily
concentrated in fewer industries (metals, textiles and apparel, plastics, chemicals). In terms of the
17In the formal estimation, we have run speci¯cations of the model that drop Hong Kong SAR, China as an export
market, and we have also examined whether re-exports of Chinese goods from Hong Kong SAR, China might account
for trade de°ection. None of our results were a®ected by these considerations, though the estimates are available from
the authors upon request.
12mix of exported goods, the top category for both countries is textiles and apparel, which account for
14.1% (17.5%) of China's (India's) exports. Metals including steel, are another important category of
exports, representing 10.1% (11.8%) of China's (India's) exports. In terms of growth rates, average
annual real growth of exports between 1993 and 2001 was 15.8% for China and 11.0% for India. In
our product-level data set, which excludes exports by each country to the U.S., EU and China or
India, average annual growth of the volume of exports (across all markets) was 16.2% for China and
11.9% for India. Given the similarities of trade structure by destination markets and by products,
the similar high rates of trade growth, and the similar frequencies of antidumping investigations (that
we discuss more in the next section), India is the best country to use as a control for China in such
a di®erence-in-di®erence framework.
On the other hand, when we estimate equation (3), we de¯ne the dependent variable as the
di®erence between Chinese export growth of product h in year t to Japan and Korea. We choose
Japan and Korea as the export destinations i and k for the following reasons: (1) Japan and Korea
are at similar stages of development with similar industrial structures, (2) the two countries have
similar aggregate rates of import growth from China, and (3) both countries frequently face U.S. and
EU antidumping measures during this time period with some overlap of products that China exports,
making them potentially good targets for identifying trade depression.
While Japan and Korea were not required by WTO rules to report changes in trade policy, in-
cluding antidumping, against China during the 1992-2001 period and, thus, any reporting may be
incomplete, some information is available. Japan reported one antidumping case against China (initi-
ated in 1991) and Korea reported eight investigations between 1992 and 2001. While the information
reported may be incomplete, it is supportive of our assumption that Japan and Korea's trade policies
against China did not involve using antidumping to enact high frequency tari® changes during this
period.
3.2 U.S. and EU antidumping policy variables
The main explanatory variables of interest are the changes to U.S. and EU import policy facing a
commodity h exported from China or from another country. Our estimates use the level of duties
imposed by the U.S. and by the EU. For EU cases that result in price undertakings, we use reported
dumping margins to proxy for the magnitude of the policy change.18
The information on U.S. and EU measures imposed at the product level derives from the Global
Antidumping Database (Bown, 2010a). For the case of the U.S. (EU) antidumping, the information
18In unreported results, we have also separated antidumping cases that end in duties versus those that end in price
undertakings, and this does not a®ect our results.
13in the dataset has been collected from original source government publications such as the Federal
Register (O±cial Journal of the European Communities), where we are able to track the dates of
investigations, measures imposed, countries a®ected, and 6-digit HS products that were targeted.
Our estimation examines the export growth path for products targeted by an antidumping measure
for multiple years around the policy's actual imposition. For both U.S. and EU antidumping measures
examined in the estimation, we identify the focal year t as the initiation year of the antidumping
investigation, as opposed to the year the ¯nal measure was actually imposed, though frequently they
will be the same. One motivation for this choice is that there has been evidence in prior research that
even antidumping investigations that do not end in imposed measures can have a destructive e®ect
on imports, due to the uncertainty as to the ¯nal disposition of the case (Staiger and Wolak, 1994).
Nevertheless, we expect that this decision could lead us to estimate a di®erential impact of Chinese
export growth with respect to the timing of U.S. versus EU measures, and in some speci¯cations we
therefore allow for the lagged imposition of policies (t ¡ 1;t ¡ 2) to a®ect contemporaneous export
growth.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Di®erence-in di®erence-estimates of trade de°ection
Do U.S. and EU antidumping duties de°ect Chinese and Indian exports to third (non-U.S., non-EU)
markets? Our di®erence-in-di®erence de°ection estimates, presented in table 8, indicate no robust
evidence of statistically signi¯cant de°ection. In fact, rather than an increase in exports to third
markets, U.S. antidumping duties may be associated with a \chilling" e®ect of a decrease in Chinese
export growth to such alternative markets. With respect to EU trade policy, the only economically
and statistically signi¯cant ¯nding is a chilling e®ect associated with EU duties on steel products.
Our baseline speci¯cation (1) examines the response of the di®erence between China's and India's
yearly growth of the volume of trade to the contemporaneous initiation of an antidumping investigation
that resulted in duties imposed by the U.S. and EU against China and/or India, respectively. At this
short time horizon, the di®erence between the within-year policy changes against China and India has
no e®ect on the di®erence in the growth of the volume of exports to alternative markets. Given that
it could take over a year for a U.S. or EU antidumping investigation to result in the imposition of a
de¯nitive import restriction, the ¯nding of no contemporaneous response in not entirely surprising.
Our second speci¯cation (2) utilizes the same dependent variable, but includes lags of the di®erence
in the change in the U.S. and EU duties, respectively. We include lags in case the full impact of a
14new antidumping restriction is not felt until the full administrative process (or perhaps even longer)
is completed. Furthermore, the timing of the e®ect of U.S. versus EU policies could vary because of
di®erences in their administrative structures, the likelihood that preliminary measures are imposed
earlier on in the investigation, etc. In this speci¯cation, we ¯nd that at one lag, an increase in the U.S.
duty against China (or India) is associated with a reduction in the growth rate of Chinese (or Indian)
exports to third countries relative to the growth rate of Indian (or Chinese) exports. We interpret this
as evidence of a potential chilling e®ect of the U.S. policy on Chinese exports to alternative markets.
The joint F-test of the overall negative impact of the contemporaneous and lagged policy imposition
indicates statistical signi¯cance at the 5% level in this speci¯cation. While the signi¯cance of this
joint test of \chilling" is not robust across all speci¯cations; nevertheless, what is striking is that
there is no evidence of the anticipated, positive impact of trade de°ection.
In terms of the magnitude of the estimates reported in speci¯cation (2), a 1% increase in the duty
against China is associated with the di®erence in the mean export growth rates between China and
India narrowing by 0.302 percentage points. In our sample, mean growth for Chinese exports over this
period was 16.2% while mean growth for Indian exports was 11.9%. Thus, raising the duty against
China by 1% is associated with a decline in the di®erential of the average growth rate of exports
between the two countries from roughly 4.3% (=16.2% - 11.9%) to 4.0%. If the U.S. were to apply
the conditional mean duty against China in the sample (125%), this would imply a 20 percentage
point reduction in Chinese export growth relative to Indian export growth of the same product.
Proceding across speci¯cations, in column (3) we rede¯ne the dependent variable to be the di®er-
ence in the growth rates of the value of exports and ¯nd that our estimates are qualitatively unchanged.
A 1% increase in a U.S. antidumping duty against one country leads that country's export growth
to be 0.3 percentage points lower in the year after initiation of the antidumping investigation that
resulted in a duty. In column (4), we introduce 6-digit product ¯xed e®ects to the estimation and the
basic result is unchanged. Column (5) replaces the Davis and Haltiwanger de¯nition for the growth
rate of exports (used in construction of the dependent variable) with the standard log growth rate
measure. This measure, by construction, omits all observations in which China or India enters or
exits a particular country's import market in a given year. While the statistical signi¯cance of the
estimated impact is reduced because the identi¯cation is driven by variation across a smaller sample
of observations, again we ¯nd an estimate of chilling associated with a U.S. antidumping duty at a
lag of one year. This estimate on purely the intensive margin suggests our results are not sensitive
to allowing for entry and exit.
Column (6) examines the e®ect of U.S. and EU antidumping duties on a subsample of steel
products (HS chapters 72 and 73). Because the steel industry is an active user of antidumping trade
15restrictions, we might be concerned that the estimated e®ects are driven entirely by steel products.
Nevertheless, our restricted steel sample indicates no statistically signi¯cant e®ect of U.S. antidumping
duties, but there is evidence of a chilling e®ect associated with EU antidumping measures in the year
after the antidumping investigation is initiated. For this subsample of products, the magnitude of the
chilling e®ect of an EU antidumping duty is slightly larger - a 1 percent increase in the duty against
one country is associated with the growth rate for the targeted country being 0.908 percentage points
lower than that of the non-targeted country.19
Finally, in column (7) of table 8, we rede¯ne our dependent variable to be the di®erence in the
growth rate of China's and India's aggregate exports (to 38 markets) for each particular product,
and we estimate equation (20). Speci¯cally, we aggregate the total value of exports of each 6-digit
HS product (less exports to the U.S., EU and India or China) in each year for China and India and
then calculate the Davis and Haltiwanger growth rate for each product aggregated across destination
markets in each year. Relative to our other speci¯cations in which each observation of product-level
export growth to each market i carries equal weight, the aggregated growth speci¯cation is less likely
to be in°uenced by outlier observations of very high or low growth coming from modest changes in
trade volumes when the level of trade is low. Notably, the mean (and standard deviation) of growth
aggregated across products for China and India are 9.3% (0.76) and 11.2% (1.15) respectively, which
are considerably lower than the mean (and standard deviation) of export growth for China and India
of 17.9% (1.27) and 11.9% (1.54), respectively, from our estimation sample for speci¯cation (3). In
the aggregated growth speci¯cation we ¯nd a slightly stonger chilling e®ect; a 1 percent increase in
the U.S. antidumping duty against China or India is associated with a growth rate for the targeted
country that is 0.396 percentage points lower than the non-targeted country in the year following
initiation of an investigation that resulted in a duty.
Thus, while there is no evidence of trade de°ection, there is some evidence that U.S. and EU
antidumping measures are associated with these targeted Chinese and Indian products slowing down
their export growth to third markets. One explanation for the \chilling e®ect" result could be that
it is self-imposed - i.e., that Chinese or Indian exporters recognize through the U.S. and EU policy
that these products are in politically sensitive product categories. Therefore, in the hope that they
might avoid such import restrictions in third markets as well, the exporters take it upon themselves
to curtail their export growth. Nevertheless, this is only one interpretation, as we cannot rule out
the possibility that this chilling e®ect is the result of the third market imposing its own import
19In unreported results available from the authors, we have con¯rmed that running a speci¯cation similar to (6) on
non-steel products does not lead to a positive and signi¯cant estimate of trade de°ection for EU antidumping imposed
in t ¡ 1.
16restrictions. We would only be able to address this distinction by having access to data that would
fully control for any product-level changes in trade policy on Chinese imports into these other (i.e.,
non-U.S., non-EU) markets, a di±cult endeavor given the lack of data reporting requirements vis-µ a-
vis China during the pre-WTO accession period of the sample, as we described in the introduction.
We do note, however, that alternative markets such as Japan and South Korea that did report use
of antidumping to the WTO during this time period targeted China with antidumping actions in
products that were di®erent from those targeted by the U.S. and EU.
4.2 Di®erence-in-di®erence estimates of trade depression
While there is evidence of a \chilling" e®ect of U.S. and EU antidumping policies on Chinese exports
to third markets, is there evidence that when the U.S. and EU impose such policies on third countries
that there is also a trade depressing e®ect on Chinese exports? Table 9 presents our results on trade
depression for Chinese exports to Japan and Korea in the face of those two countries being hit with
U.S. and EU antidumping. We ¯nd strong evidence that the imposition of U.S. antidumping duties
against Japan and Korea is associated with a large, economically and statistically signi¯cant decline
in Chinese exports to Japan and Korea.
Beginning with column (8), our baseline speci¯cation uses the di®erence in the growth of the vol-
ume of Chinese exports to Japan and Korea as the dependent variable. We ¯nd that a 1% increase in
the U.S. antidumping duty against Japan or Korea is associated with the growth of Chinese exports
to the targeted country being roughly 1.5 percentage points lower than growth to the non-targeted
country. In contrast we ¯nd no evidence of depression associated with EU AD duties. This econom-
ically large depression e®ect of U.S. antidumping is qualitatively similar across speci¯cations using
di®erent dependent variables. Column (9) presents a similar result when we add lags of the change
in the duty. Column (10) reports a somewhat larger e®ect when we rede¯ne the dependent variable
to be the di®erence in the value of export growth, and we then include product-level ¯xed e®ects in
column (11). In column (12) we use a log growth measure in order to eliminate observations on entry
and exit and focus on only the intensive margin. The contemporaneous e®ect of the depression result
still exists, though it is moderated by relative export growth two years later for those obervations
for which there was continuous export (no entry or exit). Lastly, column (13) restricts our sample
steel products and ¯nds that the magnitude of the coe±cient is roughly equal to the coe±cient in
the sample of all products, suggesting that the e®ect in steel products is similar to that in non-steel
products.
We estimate, but do not report, some additional speci¯cations to help us understand and interpret
17the magnitude of our depression result. First, we observe that entry and, especially, exit by Chinese
exporters from speci¯c markets do not drive our results. To check our results from the log growth
measure speci¯cation (12), we re-estimate speci¯cation (10) but drop all observations of Chinese
export growth to Japan or Korea that have a value of +/- 2 (indicating entry and exit). For this
speci¯cation, our estimate of the e®ect of the di®erence in a change in the U.S. duty on product h in
year t increases slightly in absolute value relative to speci¯cation (9) to -2.02 (standard error=.818)
from -1.98.
Second, we observe that depression is primarily driven by U.S. AD activity against Japan. A few
statistics bring this into view. In our sample of 29474 observations, we have only 16 antidumping
duties imposed by the U.S. against Korea, but 42 imposed against Japan.20 Moreover, when we
look at the mean growth rates of Chinese exports to Korea and Japan conditional upon a U.S.
antidumping duty, we ¯nd that Chinese exports to Korea are higher while Chinese exports to Japan
are substantially lower.
Third, we have performed a number of industry-speci¯c regressions which indicate that depression
is driven by a variety of products for which Japan faced antidumping duties over a number of years.
Fourth, because two products, ferro-silicon/silico-manganese (HS=720230) and temporary lighters
(HS=961310) were subject to antidumping investigations in di®erent years by Japan, Korea, the U.S.
and EU, we re-estimated all of our depression speci¯cations in the absence of observations on these
products. Our estimates were identical to those reported in table 4 to one decimal place.21
Lastly, to better understand the magnitude of our depression coe±cient, we calculate the mean
change in the level of the value of Chinese exports to Japan, conditional on a U.S. antidumping duty
being imposed. We ¯nd that Chinese exports to Japan fall by about U.S.$1 million when the U.S.
imposes an antidumping duty on its imports from Japan. In our dataset, aggregate Chinese exports
to Japan rise from roughly U.S.$15 billion in 1993 to U.S.$44 billion in 2001. Thus, our estimate of
depression, while large and economically signi¯cant in the markets for some products, is small relative
to the total value of Japanese imports from China.
20To clarify, although the U.S. imposed antidumping measures on roughly 95 (120) di®erent 6-digit HS export
products from Korea (Japan) during this time period, Korea (Japan) only imported 16 (42) of these same products
from China.
21Japan reported initiating an antidumping investigation on imports of ferro-silicon (HS=720230) from China in
1991. The U.S. imposed an antidumping restriction on the same 6-digit product in 1993, the EU in 1996 and Korea in
1997. The EU restricted imports of temporary lighters (HS=961310) from China in 1990 and Korea restricted imports
of the same product in 1997.
185 Robustness: IV estimates of trade de°ection and trade de-
pression
5.1 Panel data regression model
Given that our estimates of equations (2) and (3) could be sensitive to the choice of countries d (India),
i (Japan), and k (Korea), we present a ¯nal check on the robustness of our results by examining an
alternative model that relies more on cross-sectional variation across 6-digit products and countries to
obtain identi¯cation. This has some similarities to the approach taken in Bown and Crowley (2007).22
In this alternative approach, we start with the time di®erence of (1):























where we assume that country i's trade policy toward China is constant over the time period under
investigation. Then, we use 6-digit product ¯xed e®ects and lagged export growth to proxy for
time-varying cost or productivity shocks at the product level. Our estimating equation is then:
























where in estimating we apply the instumental variables techniques of Anderson and Hsiao (1981,
1982) because the autocorrelation of the dependent variable implies that least squares estimation
22Bown and Crowley (2007) estimate trade de°ection and trade depression associated with U.S. antidumping against
Japanese exports in a panel data model in which Japanese industry-level covariates proxy for technology and cost
shocks. The analysis above, in contrast, uses the di®erence-in-di®erence equation (2) that does not require product-
level controls to estimate trade de°ection. This is useful because comparably disaggregated data to proxy for technology
and costs shocks is not available for China during the sample. As a robustness check to the panel data model in Bown
and Crowley (2007), they also estimated the Japanese sample on a similar model with product-level ¯xed e®ects and
obtained consistent results, thus motivating our robustness check here. Nevertheless, a weakness with the IV approach
is the lack of valid instruments. In the approach we adopt below, the second lag of of the log level of imports has
strong predictive power for the lagged growth rate of imports. Nevertheless, a potential argument against using this
instrument is that it requires the exclusion restriction that the second lag of the log level of imports has no direct e®ect
on the current growth rate of imports
19yields biased estimates.23 In the estimation, we instrument for the lagged growth rate, ¢xciht¡1,
with the second lag of the log level of exports, ln(xciht¡2) if xciht¡2 > 1 and a value of zero if the
second lag of the level of exports is less than 1.24
By utilizing 6-digit HS product ¯xed e®ects in (5) we control for changes in production costs or
technology that imply that a particular good h will have a growth rate for exports that is higher
or lower than average. Note that commodities with very high average growth rates also tend to be
those most likely to be targeted for antidumping measures. As in equations (2) and (3) we use year
dummies to control for all aggregate variation in China and country i over time.
For estimating equation (5), we calculate annual export growth of China's exports to 38 di®erent
countries i listed in table 1, excluding the U.S., EU and India.
5.2 Instrumental variables estimates of trade de°ection and trade depres-
sion
Table 10 presents our estimates of trade de°ection and trade depression from a panel of Chinese
exports to 38 countries. Our ¯nding of a chilling e®ect of U.S. antidumping duties from the di®erence-
in-di®erence equation (2) discussed in section 4.1 appears to be robust across models. Although we
¯nd no evidence of chilling in speci¯cation (14) which regresses the growth of the volume of Chinese
trade on only the contemporaneous initiation of antidumping cases that resulted in changes in U.S.
and EU antidumping duties, when we include two lags of each change in a duty in speci¯cation (15),
we ¯nd that a 1% increase in the U.S. antidumping duty against Chinese exports is associated with
a 0.127% reduction in the growth of exports in the following year. For the conditional mean U.S.
antidumping duty on China's exports in the sample of 125%, this implies a 15.9 percentage point fall
in the growth of Chinese exports to an alternative market. When we rede¯ne the dependent variable
to be the value of exports (16), we estimate a chilling e®ect that is similar in magnitude but which
is not statistically signi¯cant at standard con¯dence levels. Part of the explanation for this result
is the additional observations added to the sample when we switch to values from volumes, as the
COMTRADE data reports many observations for Chinese export values that do not include a volume
counterpart.
23An alternative approach such as the Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM estimator which utilizes multiple lags of
the level of the dependent variable as an instrument for the lagged growth rate is not computationally feasible in our
estimation because of the large number of parameters in (5).
24Because the bias associated with using a weak instrument may be large, we test the quality of our instrument.
First-stage restricted and unrestricted regressions are reported in table A-1 for our baseline speci¯cation. For all
speci¯cations, the F-statistics of roughly 312,000 are far larger than the 99% critical Â2(1) of 6.63. We conclude that
the second lag of the log level of exports is a strong instrument for the lagged growth rate.
20In speci¯cation (17), we rede¯ne the dependent variable to be the log growth of the value of exports,
and in (18) we rede¯ne it to be the Davis-Haltiwanger growth of the value of exports aggregated across
the 38 markets in our sample. Both speci¯cations also yield chilling estimates at one lag, a 1% duty
implies roughly a 0.10 and 0.15% reduction in export growth, respectively. The last speci¯cation,
(19), restricts the sample to steel exports and ¯nds evidence consistent with our di®erence-in-di®erence
estimates of table 8, i.e., there is no statistically signi¯cant evidence of de°ection or chilling associated
with U.S. imposition of antidumping on Chinese steel.
The next set of estimates in table 10 suggest evidence of a contemporaneous chilling e®ect of an
EU antidumping duty against imports from China on Chinese exports to third countries. This di®ers
slightly from our di®erence-in-di®erence estimates presented in table 8 which found no statistically
signi¯cant relationship between EU antidumping and Chinese exports to third countries. Across the
6 speci¯cations in table 10, estimates of the magnitude of the e®ect range from a low of a 0.17% fall
in the growth of the value of Chinese exports to a high of a 0.52% fall in the value of Chinese exports
of steel products when the EU increases its duty by 1%. For the regression on steel products (column
19), although the timing is slightly di®erent, the relative size of the result vis-µ a-vis the estimate on
the full sample of products is in line with the estimates from our di®erence-in-di®erence model.
In order to understand the di®erences between the results of our di®erence-in-di®erence model
and our IV panel model, we can also examine the sources of variation in the data that identify the
de°ection/chilling e®ect for EU antidumping duties. In the di®erence-in-di®erence model of trade
de°ection, identi¯cation comes from variation between Chinese and Indian growth rates within a
product. However, EU antidumping measures are highly correlated across China and India, especially
for steel. The correlation between EU antidumping measures for China and India is 0.31 in our sample
compared to only 0.26 for the U.S. Moreover, the correlation for EU measures is higher (0.66) when we
limit our sample to steel products compared to a correlation of 0.47 for the U.S. Thus, identi¯cation of
the e®ect of EU antidumping duties is relatively weak in the di®erence-in-di®erence model. However,
there is some evidence of chilling in the IV panel estimates because identi¯cation in that model comes
from (a) time variation in the growth rate within a product exported by China and (b) cross sectional
variation across products exported by China.
Next consider the third panel of table 10 which presents our estimates of trade depression associ-
ated with U.S. antidumping duties against China. In contrast to our results from the di®erence-in-
di®erence model, there is no robust evidence of trade depression associated with U.S. antidumping
duties from our IV estimates on a panel of 38 of China's trading partners. While the estimated
coe±cient on the contemporaneous e®ect is frequently negative, it is not statistically signi¯cant.
The lowest panel of estimates in table 10 presents coe±cient estimates of potential trade depression
21arising from EU antidumping duties. As with the U.S. estimates, there is no robust evidence of trade
depression associated with EU antidumping duties. For two speci¯cations, the log growth measure
(column 17) and steel products (column 19), there is one statistically signi¯cant coe±cient estimate
that indicates trade depression. However, as these results are not robust to slight changes in the
speci¯cation.
A simple explanation for the lack of trade depression in the IV panel model can be found by
re-estimating the speci¯cation in column (15) on a restricted sample of Chinese exports to Japan
and Korea only. In this smaller sample we do observe contemporaneous trade depression, consistent
with our di®erence-in-di®erence estimates reported in table 9. This suggests that Japan and Korea
are unusual among China's export partners and that the phenonomenon of trade depression is likely
limited to the few countries that face very high antidumping duties emanating from the U.S. and EU.
5.3 Puzzles and Potential Explanations
A number of potentially complementary explanations are consistent with our results that Chinese
exporters did not de°ect trade during the 1992-2001 period. First, it could be that the Chinese
products hit with U.S. and EU antidumping measures are primarily the function of export platform
activity that can easily be disassembled and relocated to another country. It could also be that some
of the products are highly di®erentiated with speci¯cations designed (by U.S. or EU retailers) for
one particular export market. Or it could be that these other WTO members were applying higher
(non-MFN) tari®s against China during its pre-accession period that China was not able to penetrate.
Finally, it could relate to the fact that as a \new" entrant into the global economy, Chinese ¯rms did
not yet have the networks over the 1992-2001 period to de°ect trade to alternate markets, perhaps
not yet having paid the market-speci¯c ¯xed cost of entry.
Regardless of the explanation, our result of \missing" trade de°ection is puzzling given that
there was such concern about the phenomenon among the WTO membership that China's terms of
accession include a safeguard to pre-emptively control it.
6 Conclusion
China's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) introduced a new China safeguard that
allowed existing members to substantially deviate from the WTO's core principles of reciprocity and
most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment based on the threat of trade de°ection. This paper uses a
new data set to construct measures of product-level, discriminatory trade policy actions that two of
China's most important trading partners imposed on its exports during the 1992-2001 period. We
22¯nd no systematic evidence that either U.S. or EU imposition of discriminatory import restrictions
during this period de°ected Chinese exports to alternative destinations. To the contrary, we provide
some evidence that EU and U.S. trade restrictions may have a chilling e®ect on China's exports to
third markets - i.e., the application of the mean U.S. duty is associated with a 20 percentage point
reduction in the relative growth of targeted Chinese (vis-µ a-vis untargeted Indian) exports of the same
product.
Our results do raise a number of policy concerns. One derives from a comparison of the results
in this paper and the empirical evidence of trade de°ection from studies of developed countries (e.g.,
Bown and Crowley, 2007). Developing country exporters may face an additional cost to antidumping
if they are unable to de°ect trade and recoup some of their losses.25 This could suggest that the
failure to reform antidumping in the Doha Round is even more detrimental to developing countries
than had previously been considered.
The lack of historical evidence of Chinese trade de°ection presents a potential additional con-
cern raised by the terms of China's WTO accession. Given the theoretical insights of Bagwell and
Staiger (2002) regarding the importance of the reciprocity and MFN rules to the sustainability of the
e±ciency-enhancing features of the WTO, the easy-to-access, new China safeguard remains a threat
to the WTO. The China safeguard policy itself may pose a bigger threat to the world trading system
than the trade de°ection it was partially designed to control.
25For example, we found China did not de°ect steel exports whereas Japan did de°ect steel exports in the face of
U.S. antidumping measures. Thus, the lack of trade de°ection by developing countries is not simply a product-level
phenomenon determined solely by the di®erences in the countries' export baskets.
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26Figure 1: Trade Destruction Associated with U.S. and EU Antidumping on Imports from China,
1990-2001
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Notes: year t is the beginning of the antidumping investigation. Products defined at the 6-digit HS level 
with import data from Comtrade. Antidumping data is taken from Bown (2010a). 
27Table 1: China's and India's Major Export Markets, 1997
Rank  Export Market  
Share of China’s 
Total Exports, 1997 
Share of India’s 
Total Exports, 1997 
       
1  Hong Kong SAR, China  0.240  0.056 
2  United States   0.179  0.196 
3  Japan   0.174  0.055 
4  European Union  0.131  0.265 
5  South Korea  0.050  0.014 
6  Singapore  0.024  0.022 
7  Taiwan, China   0.019  0.011 
8  Russia  0.011  0.028 
9  Malaysia  0.011  0.014 
10  Australia  0.011  0.013 
11  Canada  0.010  0.012 
12  Indonesia  0.010  0.013 
13  Thailand  0.008  0.001 
14  Philippines  0.007  0.007 
15  United Arab Emirates  0.007  0.047 
16  Vietnam  0.006  0.004 
17  Brazil  0.006  0.004 
18  Panama  0.006  0.001 
19  India  0.005  - 
20  Saudi Arabia  0.005  0.020 
21  South Africa  0.004  0.012 
22  Bangladesh  0.004  0.023 
23  Poland  0.004  0.003 
24  Pakistan  0.004  0.004 
25  Macau  0.004  0.000 
26  Switzerland  0.003  0.010 
27  Myanmar  0.003  0.001 
28  Norway  0.003  0.002 
29  Chile  0.003  0.004 
30  Turkey  0.003  0.007 
31  North Korea  0.003  0.001 
32  Iran  0.003  0.005 
33  Argentina  0.003  0.003 
34  Egypt  0.003  0.007 
35  Mexico  0.002  0.003 
36  Nigeria  0.002  0.006 
37  Hungary  0.002  0.001 
38  New Zealand  0.002  0.002 
39  Israel  0.001  0.000 
40  Czech Republic  0.001  0.001 
41  Kazakhastan  0.001  0.000 
  China  -  0.021 
       
Source: compiled by the authors from COMTRADE. 
28Table 2: U.S. and EU Use of Antidumping Measures, 1992-2001
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1  China  55  (0.14)  35  (0.64) 26 (0.47) 137.27  0.08 (5)
2  EU  47  (0.12)  20  (0.43) 10 (0.21) 29.24  0.19 (2)
3  Japan  38  (0.10)  21  (0.55) 11 (0.29) 63.11  0.13 (3)
4  South Korea  32  (0.08)  15  (0.47) 3 (0.09) 15.36  0.03 (7)
5  Taiwan, 
China 
23  (0.06)  13  (0.57)  3  (0.13)  19.72  0.03  (6) 
6  Mexico  21  (0.05)  7  (0.33) 4 (0.19) 43.60  0.10 (4)
7  Brazil  18  (0.05)  9  (0.50)  1  (0.06)  63.35  0.01  (12) 
8  Canada  18  (0.05)  5  (0.28)  6  (0.33)  22.38  0.19  (1) 
9  India  16  (0.04)  9  (0.56)  2  (0.13)  50.37  0.01  (19) 
10  South Africa  12  (0.03)  5  (0.42)  1  (0.08)  42.95  0.00  (26) 
                     
  All other  116  (0.29)  50  (0.43)  12  (0.10)  73.50  0.22   
                     
                     
Total  396  (1.00)  189  (0.48)  79  (0.20)  66.31  1.00   
                   

















(%),  cond’l 
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1  China  53  (0.15)  23  (0.43) 27 (0.51) 76.93  0.06 (4)
2  India  28  (0.08)  15  (0.54) 6 (0.21) 80.85  0.01 (20)
3  South Korea  26  (0.07)  13  (0.50) 7 (0.27) 24.58  0.02 (9)
4  Thailand  22  (0.06)  13  (0.59) 1 (0.05) 41.87  0.01 (21)
5  Russia  19  (0.05)  10  (0.53) 3 (0.16) 99.81  0.03 (6)
6  Taiwan, 
China 
16  (0.04)  8  (0.50)  6  (0.38)  28.11  0.03  (7) 
7  Malaysia  15  (0.04)  9  (0.60)  1  (0.07)  34.52  0.02  (18) 
8  Ukraine  14  (0.04)  7  (0.50)  0  (0.00)  132.43  0.00  (50) 
9  Indonesia  13  (0.04)  7  (0.54)  0  (0.00)  60.77  0.01  (23) 
10  Turkey  13  (0.04)  3  (0.23)  3  (0.23)  32.63  0.02  (13) 
                     
  All other  138  (0.39)  67  (0.49)  20  (0.14)  58.85  0.78   
                     
                     
Total  357  (1.00)  175  (0.49)  74  (0.21)  60.04  1.00   
                   
Note:   Antidumping data compiled by the authors from Bown (2010a). Import data from COMTRADE. †EU import data is 
extra-EU imports only. 






Exports from China facing U.S. antidumping measures  77 
Exports from China facing EU antidumping measures  60 
  Exports from China facing both U.S. and EU antidumping measures  14 
Exports from India facing U.S. antidumping measures  36 
Exports from India facing EU antidumping measures  32 
  Exports from India facing both U.S. and EU antidumping measures 8 
Notes: data compiled by the authors based on Bown (2010a). 
† ‘Unique’ relates to the fact that some 6-digit HS 
products may have been investigated or hit with an antidumping measure more than once during the 12 year 
sample. 
30Table 4: China's Export Products Targeted by Both U.S. and EU Antidumping, 1990-2001
Product
† (HS 1992 codes)
Year of EU AD 
Measure Against China 
Year of U.S. AD 
Measure Against China 
     
Foundry Coke (270400)   1999  2000 
Persulfates (283340)   1994  1996 
Sulfanilic Acid (292142)   2001  1991 
Coumarin (293221)   1994  1994 
Ferrosilicon (720221, 720229)   1992  1992 
Silicomanganese (720230)   1996  1993 
Steel Plate (720842, 720843)   1999  1996 
Iron Waterworks Fittings (730719)   1999  1992 
Carbon Steel Pipe Fittings (730793)   1994  1991 
Lug Nuts (731816)   1996  1990 
Pure Magnesium (810411, 810419)   1997  2000 
     
Notes: data compiled by the authors based on Bown (2010a). † Production description based on that listed in the U.S. 
antidumping investigation. 
31Table 5: Data Summary Statistics for Di®erence-in-Di®erence Approach to Trade De°ection
Difference-in-Difference Model of Deflection 
Sample Size  Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Dependent Variables
Difference in volume of export growth of product h 227555 0.0431 1.9788
Yearly growth of the volume of China’s exports of product h 227555 0.1621 1.2355
Yearly growth of the volume of India's exports of product h 227555 0.1190 1.5700
Difference in value of export growth of product h 259595 0.0602 1.9812
Yearly growth of the value of China’s exports of product h 259595 0.1797 1.2690
Yearly growth of the value of India’s exports of product h 259595 0.1195 1.5471
Difference in value of export growth of product h to ROW  37378 -0.0192 1.3695
Yearly growth of the value of China’s exports of product h to ROW  37378 0.0932 0.7600
Yearly growth of the value of India’s exports of product h to ROW  37378 0.1124 1.1565
Explanatory Variables 
U.S. AD duty against China less U.S. AD duty against  India  227555 0.0012 0.0361
U.S. AD duty against China conditional on a duty (%)  429 125.12 80.51
U.S. AD duty against India conditional on a duty (%)  156 41.44 35.00
EU AD duty against China less EU AD duty against  India  227555 0.0002 0.0272
EU AD duty against China conditional on a duty (%)  392 67.06 38.11
EU AD duty against India conditional on a duty (%)  319 65.64 66.48
U.S. AD duty against China less U.S. AD duty against  India  259595 0.0011 0.0346
U.S. AD duty against China conditional on a duty (%)  459 123.28 80.22
U.S. AD duty against India conditional on a duty (%)  156 41.43 34.62
EU AD duty against China less EU AD duty against  India  259595 0.0002 0.0265
EU AD duty against China conditional on a duty (%)  411 67.46 38.51
EU AD duty against India conditional on a duty (%)  319 65.58 67.18
U.S. AD duty against China less U.S. AD duty against  India  37378 0.0010 0.0351
U.S. AD duty against China conditional on a duty (%)  57 141.44 88.41
U.S. AD duty against India conditional on a duty (%)  25 44.75 33.49
EU AD duty against China less EU AD duty against  India  37378 0.0002 0.0178
EU AD duty against China conditional on a duty (%)  37 57.04 33.05
EU AD duty against India conditional on a duty (%)  19 63.55 65.25
32Table 6: Data Summary Statistics for Di®erence-in-Di®erence Approach to Trade Depression
Difference-in-Difference Model of Depression 
Sample Size  Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Dependent Variables
Difference in volume of export growth of product h 25975 -0.0763 1.4853
Yearly growth of the volume of China’s exports to Japan 
25975 0.1439 1.0256
Yearly growth of the volume of China's exports to Korea   25975 0.2202 1.2432
Difference in value of export growth of product h 29474 -0.0686 1.5173
Yearly growth of the value of China’s exports to Japan  29474 0.1744 1.0121
Yearly growth of the value of India’s exports of product h 29474 0.2430 1.2628
Explanatory Variables 
U.S. AD duty against Japan less U.S. AD duty against Korea  25975 0.0004 0.0121
U.S. AD duty against Japan conditional on a duty (%)  39 35.82 24.99
U.S. AD duty against Korea conditional on a duty (%)  15 16.36 14.31
EU AD duty against Japan less EU AD duty against  Korea  25975 0.0001 0.0124
EU AD duty against Japan conditional on a duty (%)  9 81.44 29.37
EU AD duty against Korea conditional on a duty (%)  11 36.09 26.46
U.S. AD duty against Japan less U.S. AD duty against Korea  29474 0.0004 0.0127
U.S. AD duty against Japan conditional on a duty (%)  42 38.29 26.22
U.S. AD duty against Korea conditional on a duty (%)  16 16.77 13.92
EU AD duty against Japan less EU AD duty against  Korea  29474 0.0001 0.0116
EU AD duty against Japan conditional on a duty (%)  9 81.44 29.37
EU AD duty against Korea conditional on a duty (%)  12 34.20 26.06





















and EU AD 
Targeting 
India† 
           
01-05  Animal and Animal 
Products 
0.000  0.028  0.000  0.000 
06-15  Vegetable Products  0.000  0.028  0.000  0.013 
16-24  Foodstuffs  0.137  0.055  0.076  0.013 
25-27  Mineral Products  0.027  0.097  0.018  0.000 
28-38  Chemicals & Allied 
Industries 
0.157  0.159  0.157  0.053 
39-40  Plastics / Rubber   0.035  0.014  0.039  0.067 
41-43  Leather   0.013  0.014  0.006  0.000 
44-49  Wood & Wood 
Products 
0.069  0.021  0.042  0.000 
50-63  Textiles & Apparel  0.141  0.028  0.175  0.173 
64-67  Footwear / Headgear  0.004  0.021  0.011  0.000 
68-71  Stone / Glass   0.047  0.007  0.040  0.000 
72-83  Metals  0.101  0.433  0.118  0.667 
84-85  Machinery / Electrical   0.170  0.048  0.202  0.013 
86-89  Transportation  0.027  0.014  0.022  0.000 
90-97  Miscellaneous  0.065  0.035  0.089  0.000 
           
Source: compiled by the authors from COMTRADE and Bown (2010a). †Measured as the share of the exporter’s 
total number of 6-digit HS tariff lines subject to U.S. and EU antidumping between 1990 and 2001. 
34Table 8: Di®erence-In-Di®erence Approach to Trade De°ection: The Impact of U.S. and EU An-
tidumping on China's Export Growth Relative to India's Export Growth, 1992-2001
Dependent Variable: 
Yearly growth† of China’s exports of product h to country i less  



























U.S. AD duty against China less  
  U.S. AD duty against India 
             
  Duty imposed on  product h in year t  -0.033  -0.023  -0.052  -0.049  0.054  -0.311  0.044 
  (0.115)  (0.115)  (0.106)  (0.116)  (0.158)  (0.241)  (0.190) 
               
  Duty imposed on  product h in year t-1    -0.302***  -0.297***  -0.249**  -0.270*  -0.096  -0.396** 
    (0.109)  (0.103)  (0.113)  (0.156)  (0.218)  (0.189) 
               
  Duty imposed on  product h in year t-2   0.080  -0.020  -0.026  -0.005  0.043  -0.104 
  (0.116)  (0.112)  (0.121)  (0.166)  (0.204)  (0.210) 
EU AD duty against China  less  
  EU AD duty against India           
  Duty imposed on  product h in year t  0.137  0.138  0.104  0.004  0.132  -0.362  0.514 
  (0.152)  (0.152)  (0.143)  (0.155)  (0.198)  (0.446)  (0.415) 
               
  Duty imposed on  product h in year t-1    -0.056  0.058  -0.028  0.131  -0.908**  0.539 
    (0.147)  (0.140)  (0.152)  (0.191)  (0.427)  (0.376) 
               
  Duty imposed on  product h in year t-2   0.117  0.104  0.080  0.255  -0.030  -0.166 
  (0.146)  (0.140)  (0.152)  (0.182)  (0.404)  (0.369) 
Other Controls               
             
  Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
  Product h fixed effects  No  No  No  Yes  No  No  No 
               
Observations  227555  227462  270960  270960  110691  13430  40774 
R
2  0.003  0.003  0.002  0.019  0.002  0.003  0.003 
Notes: † Subscript h is a 6-digit HS product, and t is a year. With the exception of specification (5), the growth rate is defined using the Davis and 
Haltiwanger  (1992) measure described in the text and is thus bounded between -2 (exit) and 2 (entry).  In parentheses are standard errors, with  ***, **, 
and * denote variables statistically significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
35Table 9: Di®erence-In-Di®erence Approach to Trade Depression: The Impact of U.S. and EU An-
tidumping on China's Export Growth to Japan Relative to Korea, 1992-2001
Dependent Variable: 
Yearly growth† of China’s exports of product h to Japan less  






















U.S. AD duty against Japan less  
  U.S. AD duty against Korea 
           
  Duty imposed on  product h in year t  -1.480*  -1.627**  -1.979***  -1.853**  -3.499***  -1.999** 
  (0.756)  (0.778)  (0.693)  (0.809)  (1.255)  (0.926) 
             
  Duty imposed on  product h in year t-1    0.990  0.823  1.133  0.403  1.243 
    (0.685)  (0.630)  (0.743)  (0.891)  (0.854) 
             
  Duty imposed on  product h in year t-2   0.563  0.531  0.790  2.187**  -0.663 
  (0.626)  (0.599)  (0.716)  (0.875)  (0.825) 
EU AD duty against Japan less  
  EU AD duty against Korea             
             
  Duty imposed on  product h in year t  0.033  0.035  0.261  0.057  -0.247  -0.027 
  (0.741)  (0.741)  (0.755)  (0.862)  (0.883)  (1.546) 
             
  Duty imposed on  product h in year t-1    -0.261  -0.027  -0.473  -0.946  3.332 
      (0.837)  (0.772)  (0.930)  (0.984)  (2.778) 
             
  Duty imposed on  product h in year t-2    0.213  -0.062  -0.550  1.495*  -2.525 
  (0.771)  (0.719)  (0.857)  (0.879)  (2.781) 
             
Other Controls             
           
  Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
  Product h fixed effects  No  No  No  Yes  No  No 
             
Observations  25975  25966  29474  29474  21123  1483 
R
2  0.013  0.013  0.013  0.111  0.012  0.050 
Notes: † Subscript h is a 6-digit HS product, and t is a year. With the exception of specification (12), the growth rate is defined using the Davis and Haltiwanger  
(1992) measure described in the text and is thus bounded between -2 (exit) and 2 (entry).  In parentheses are standard errors, with  ***, **, and * denote 
variables statistically significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
36Table 10: IV Approach and Panel Estimates: The Impact of U.S. and EU Antidumping Measures on
China's Exports to Third Markets, 1992-2001
Notes: † Subscript h is a 6-digit HS product, and t is a year. With the exception of specification (17), the growth rate is defined using the Davis and Haltiwanger  
(1992) measure described in the text and is thus bounded between -2 (exit) and 2 (entry).  In parentheses are White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent standard 
errors corrected for clusters defined on the variable defined as the 6-digit HS product and year combination.  ***, **, and * denote variables statistically 
significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
Dependent Variable: Yearly growth† of China’s exports of 
product h to country i























U.S. AD duty against China [Trade Deflection] 
































EU AD duty against China [Trade Deflection]             
































U.S. AD duty against country i [Trade Depression]            
































EU AD duty against country i [Trade Depression]            
































Other Controls            
Instruments for growth of China’s exports of h to 
 country i in t-1 Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Product h fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  478931  478851  563430  355555  38282  28762 
R
2  0.09  0.09  0.09  0.04  0.12  0.10 
37Table A-1: Testing Instrument Quality: First Stage Regressions
Notes: † Subscript h is a 6-digit HS product, and t is a year, the growth rate is defined using the Davis and Haltiwanger  (1992) measure described in the 
text and is thus bounded between -2 (exit) and 2 (entry).  In parentheses are White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors corrected for clusters 
defined on the variable defined as the 6-digit HS product and year combination.  ***, **, and * denote variables statistically significant at the 1, 5, and 
10 percent levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable: Yearly growth† of China’s exports of 
product h to country i in t-1
Explanatory Variables  Unrestricted first stage regression  
(15)
Restricted first stage regression  
(15)
U.S. AD duty against China 












EU AD duty against China  












U.S. AD duty against country i












EU AD duty against country i













Second lag of the log level of China’s exports of h to country i -0.131*** 
(0.000)  -- 
Product h fixed effects  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes 
Observations  534768  534768 
R
2  0.39  0.03 
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